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“Stalin will not return to Gori, but temporarily.” 
“Stalin will not return to Gori, but temporarily.” – with such a clearly 
Freudian slip began the news broadcast on December 14, 2013 by a reporter 
for one of the most popular TV channels in Georgia. She in fact intended 
to say that Stalin’s statue would not be re-erected1 on December 21st (Sta-
lin‘s birthday), and that it would happen later, since the installation was post-
poned. But instead of a clear formulation, she articulated a message, which 
unconsciously mirrored an existing split within Georgian society. 
In the period from December 2012 to December 2013, Stalin’s sculp-
ture became a symbol of antinomy between different fragments of the Geor-
gian population, well illustrated by the fluctuations between re-installations 
and de-installations and/or the defamation of the re-installed statues in the 
different villages and cities of Georgia2. The sensitivity of the issue is con-
firmed by the fact that in response to the question “What do you think about 
Stalin and the Patriarch’s evaluation of him?”3 which was asked by media rep-
resentatives to the seven candidates of the October 2013 presidential elec-
tions, four articulated double messages (“He is good, but he is bad” type for-
mulations), while three candidates refused to answer the question under one 
pretext or another.
The fact that fluctuations (between re-installations and de-installations 
of the Stalin’s sculptures) took place in this particular period could be ex-
plained, by a number of political factors, which remain outside the topic of 
the current discussion, but also by the peculiar emotional atmosphere trig-
gered by the so-called “prison scandal”4 which preceded the parliamentary 
elections and awoke in the population feelings of humiliation, dehumaniza-
tion, helplessness and rage – triggering societal trauma associated with a to-
talitarian period, which exists and is at the same time denied within Geor-
gian society. 
This article discusses the impact of totalitarian trauma on Georgian so-
ciety as a large group5. The conceptual framework of the paper is based on the 
psychodynamic research on individual development of Melanie Klein and 
Michael Sebek and the studies of small and large group processes by Vamik 
Volkan, Wilfred Bion and Earl Hopper.
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In order to shed light onto societal dynamics resulting from traumatic 
events, the first part of the article analyzes the impact of totalitarian trauma 
on an intra-psychic level; further, the article focuses on the implications of 
totalitarian trauma on a societal level, the phenomenon preventing society 
from overcoming totalitarian trauma – the inability to authentically mourn 
is discussed; while the following section focuses on the mechanisms facilitat-
ing the denial of totalitarian trauma by the Georgian society. The last section 
analyzes the consequences of unprocessed totalitarian trauma and its impact 
on the current socio-political life of the country.
Totalitarian Trauma at an Intra-psychic Level
From a psychotraumatological perspective totalitarian society could 
be described as a dynamic interaction between three key stakeholders: 
“Victim(s)”, “Aggressor(s)” and “Bystander(s)”6. An interaction which I would 
suggest calling “a totalitarian situation.” The three roles of the totalitarian sit-
uation often flow into one another.  Victimization of “Victim” by “Aggressor” 
does not concern only the two of them. It is also a powerful message for the 
“Bystander,” via which the external totalitarian object (Sebek, 1996) is “depos-
iting” himself into the selves (of “Bystanders”) who experience a feeling of 
helplessness triggered by witnessing repressions. To explore a particular to-
talitarian situation, all three subjects should be studied. Below are the find-
ings of research ( Javakhishvili, 2011), which uses in-depth interviews with 
the family members of the repressed (“Victims”)7 to shed some light on the 
processes of the internalization of totalitarian object (Sebek, 1996).
The identity formation of the children of repressed people was influ-
enced by peculiar conditions. Namely, the label “son/daughter of the People’s 
Enemy” put on them immediately following the repression of a parent was 
facilitating feelings of shame and guilt as well as the division of the inner 
(psychic) and outer worlds into “good” and “bad” objects8. On a phenomeno-
logical level, this division was experienced by a child as an existential reflec-
tion, in order to determine one’s own position between “Good” and “Bad”, 
i.e. one of the respondents stated: “I had to reflect on this when I was 11: 
as the society was divided, I was wondering where I stood: whether I live in 
enemy’s family or proper family.” If a child was so lucky that one of the par-
ents (most often the mother) was not repressed, she was usually devastated 
to such an extent that the child perceived her as helpless, often emotionally 
numbed and detached (depressive position), or by contrast too emotional and 
over-controlling (anxiety/paranoid position). Both of these examples lead to 
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attachment difficulties among children. One of the coping strategies among 
the respondents was full acceptance of the “rules of the game” of the system, 
phenomenologically experienced as the desire “to be like others”. I.e., one of 
the respondents whose father was repressed claimed during the interview: “I 
was standing as a guard of honor at Stalin’s statue. It’s bizarre, but everybody 
were there, so I wanted to be there as well.” This was preventing the develop-
ment of creativity and critical thinking and provoking a willingness to partic-
ipate in the “full package” of “Soviet fabric” – starting with becoming “young 
Leninists”, then moving to the “ranks of pioneers,” and then to “Komsomol”9. 
In certain cases, daughters and sons of the repressed were trying to become 
members of the Communist Party and/or enter the secret police – though the 
attitude towards it was often negative i.e., according to the one respondent: 
“My attitude towards communist party – fully negative. But I really wanted 
to be in it, because this was giving me a possibility for advancement.” The 
choice of a life partner was also influenced by trauma – i.e. some respondents 
of the study reported marrying representatives of the regime; out of those, 
some respondents reported the re-enactment of the victim-aggressor interac-
tion within these families, i.e. one of the respondents claimed:
“I always wonder how my grandmother married my grandfather. Her 
parents were killed by the regime while that my grandfather was serving: he 
was a criminal investigator. Most likely, she tried to be somehow affiliated 
with the regime…at home he was very violent.”
The aforementioned conditions were preventing the children of the re-
pressed from achieving their developmental tasks, especially the formation of 
the integrated personal structure and identity. Love towards the repressed 
parent, combined with the perception of him/her as a “People’s enemy” and 
the associated conscious or unconscious rage and/or hate, as well as the ab-
sence of the parent and the depressive or paranoid-schizoid condition of an 
unrepressed parent were hindering accomplishment of the identification task. 
At the same time, via instrumentalization of fear and “deposition”(Volkan, 
2006) of the totalitarian object, the Soviet system was creating conditions for 
the substitution of the absent parent with the most “available” and power-
ful Father figure – Stalin himself (and here the fact that Stalin was an ethnic 
Georgian was facilitating identification) – or any authoritative figure in the 
social surrounding (teacher, caregiver, etc.) symbolizing the aggressor/regime. 
Double identification both with the victim and aggressor was taking place 
among children of the repressed, resulting in the traumatic split of their iden-
tity, which is well illustrated by the known fact that many of the children of 
the repressed were crying with similar emotion both when they learned about 
the death of their repressed parent and of the death of Stalin. Respondents 
23
The Soviet Legacy in Contemporary Georgia: A Psycho traumatological Perspective 
report that they were surprised and confused by their own reactions. From 
the psychodynamic point of view their reactions seem consistent as they in-
dicate an internalized totalitarian object.
The regime was instrumentalizing not only it repressions of the “Vic-
tims” but the repressed (“Victims”) themselves were instrumentalized to 
represent a possible “worst case scenario” for the “Bystanders” and thus fa-
cilitated obedience to the regime and the internalization of the totalitarian 
object on a larger societal scale. Helplessness and fear triggered among “By-
standers” due to witnessing repressions was facilitative of their identifica-
tion with the victim; at the same time, tolerating brutalities they witnessed 
was facilitative of their identification with the aggressor. As a result, “By-
standers” “wore” both (victim and aggressor) identities. This explains how 
easy these three roles flowed into one another – i.e. working for the regime 
did not help people to avoid repressions and thus “aggressors” were becom-
ing victims themselves; “bystanders” had to often “earn” their right to stay 
apart from the repressions via voting or signing this or that document le-
gitimizing the repression of other persons/groups, which was turning them 
into “aggressors” as well; if they would not agree/sign/vote – they were risk-
ing to be victimized as well. This cycle of violence was engaging all the three 
subjects of the totalitarian triangle.
Unmourned Totalitarian Trauma in Georgia
The traumatising potential of a stressor is mediated by two types of fac-
tors: scale and strength of the stressor itself (whether it is associated with vi-
olence or not, or whether it causes death or not) and the condition/maturity 
of the subject (individual/family/community/society as a large group) that is 
affected by the stressor (Shawn P. Cahill, 2007).
Georgia as a subject, at the moment of Sovietisation, was extremely vul-
nerable and immature due to the long-term experience of Russian coloniza-
tion, and a very brief experience of statehood (from declaring independence 
in 1918 to annexation by the Red army in 1921). As of the system of stressors 
affecting country during the Soviet period, it is comparable with those caus-
ing Complex trauma (Herman, 1992): repetitive, prolonged, evolving direct 
physical and/or psychological harm, unpredictable and at the same time in-
escapable. All three categories of traumatising stressors (Hopper, 2000) were 
present in the Soviet period:
* Everyday life strains, such as ongoing totalitarian control and fears re-
lated to it – i.e. fear to express a different opinion, to be denounced by ones 
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neighbour, to be blamed for “subversive” activity (which was enough to be 
arrested), etc.; It is interesting to note that one of the most common warn-
ings against doing something, used in Georgia in the Soviet period, (often 
as a joke) was “dagicheren”/”dagvicheren,” meaning “you’ll be arrested”/”we’ll 
be arrested.”
* Cumulative stressors, such as small scale – family or close community 
level – incidents caused by the regime, such as the arrests of family members, 
attending interrogations, “wearing” the stigma of the “People’s enemy’s fam-
ily member,” somatic illness facilitated by trauma and the inability to obtain 
proper treatment due to poverty, etc.; 
* Catastrophic stressors, such as mass killings, which affected all levels of 
society. Here we can list Russian annexation in 1921, the suppression of the 
rebellion against Russian annexation in 1924, the shooting of young demon-
strators protesting against the condemnation of Stalin’s cult by N. Khrush-
chev in 1956, the violent dispersal of the peaceful assembly demanding inde-
pendence from Russia on 9th of April, 1989. 
Due to the complexity of the system of stressors, totalitarian trauma 
in Georgia (as elsewhere) resulted in multiple losses – of security, dignity, 
strength, self-esteem, certainty, control over ones own life, as well as the loss 
of the objects in which a person or group invested considerable emotions – 
starting from loved ones and ending with possessions. 
Overcoming the trauma of loss requires a process of mourning, which 
allows one to deal with the emotions related to loss, find explanation and put 
meaning in what has happened, facilitate an adequate appreciation of what 
has been lost, and integrate the psychic representations of their most valued 
aspects into one’s own self (Volkan, 2006, Robert A. Neimeyer, 2002, James 
Gillies, 2006). Via this internal work, a new post-traumatic identity develops 
allowing post-traumatic growth (Alex P. Linley, 2011). This has the effect of 
freeing societal energy from its attachment to the past (totalitarian object), al-
lowing it to enter a new constructive object-relationships and regard the Reali-
ty Principle(Freud, 1961). According to Hopper, authentic mourning “leads to 
more satisfactory social adjustment […] to the prevailing social, cultural and 
political conditions, allowing for attempts to change those conditions that 
are felt to be unacceptable, or in other words, to good citizenship”(Hopper, 
2000, p.30).
If the normal process of mourning is hindered due to this or that rea-
son, and a large group is not able to mourn, it develops traumatic identity 
and enters a state described by Volkan as “perennial mourner” causing regres-
sion to the less complex stages of development (Volkan, 2006). Unmourned 
trauma has a tendency to transmit from generation to generation via different 
25
The Soviet Legacy in Contemporary Georgia: A Psycho traumatological Perspective 
narratives, prevailing basic assumptions and discourses, patterns of commu-
nication and interactions within the group, causing a new cycle of traumati-
zation. This drives large groups to a psychotic state of exaggerated narcissism 
(Vamik D. Volkan, 2009, Volkan, 2004) and disregard of the Reality principle, 
hinders its development, and increases risks of such catastrophic consequenc-
es as inter-ethnic conflicts and wars. According to Bion, within the group 
which has lost effective contact with reality there develops “a group mental-
ity that has such a culture that the individual, despite his or her sophisticated 
and mature skills, can be caused to regress to and be temporarily caught up 
in primitive splitting and projective identification, depersonalization, and in-
fantile regression”(Bion, 1961, p. 94).
In large groups there are both conscious and unconscious ways to 
mourn trauma. Mourning could involve different levels/spheres of societal 
life: a) erecting of monuments symbolizing loss, b) rethinking the past with 
an intention to explain and put meaning in it, c) implementing a restorative 
justice approach, etc.(Volkan, 2006).
In the Soviet epoch, mourning grief related to totalitarian trauma was 
not possible in Georgia, as it would interfere with the survival need. After re-
gaining independence, the country again failed to mourn totalitarian trauma 
since it was denied. As of traumatic events that took place in the recent histo-
ry of Georgia, the societal responses to them turned into what Hopper refers 
to as pseudo-mourning (Hopper, 2003) which prevents authentic mourning 
and thus hinders the processing/overcoming of traumatic experience. Hop-
per distinguishes three types of pseudo-mourning: Sentimental, Triumphant 
and Revengeful. We can easily track these patterns in Georgia.
If we take as an example, April 9, 1989, the violent events of that day 
21 persons killed, among whom majority were young women, a large num-
ber of demonstrators dispersed in a violent way – using neuro-paralytic gas 
and spades, the Russian military in the streets in the aftermath of the vio-
lence, etc.] facilitated the victimization of Georgian society as a large group 
(perception of own self as a Victim), which complicated the process of grief. 
Mourning went on in a prolonged, ritualized and dramatic way: i.e. widely 
broadcasted sentimental-pathetic song “Give Tulips to One Another” com-
posed following the event and sang together by the country’s pop singers; a 
large number of people who were approaching hospitals due to feeling intoxi-
cated by the neuro-paralytic gas, while medical doctors were finding signs of 
intoxication only among a few of them (which was indicative of post-trau-
matic mental health conditions among the rest); ladies in black – personified 
mourners, following representatives of the National-Liberation movement 
everywhere. All of these fit the description of Sentimental mourning – “mas-
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ochistic defence implying compulsive ritualized prolonged wailing and senti-
mental optimistic clichés”(Hopper, 2003, p.61). At a certain point, cumulat-
ed frustration turned sentimental mourning into rage, provoking Revengeful 
(sadistic) mourning implying the urge for revenge. This, in combination with 
shared victimization contributed to the escalation of inter-ethnic conflicts 
in the country. Two years later, on April 9, 1991 the government of Geor-
gia signed a document of independence thus turned the trauma anniversary 
into triumph or Triumphant mourning described by Hopper – “manic defence 
against anxiety caused by loss, denial of grief accompanied often with the il-
lusion of own omnipotence” (Hopper, 2003, p.61).
A clear example of Triumphant mourning is the huge meeting in Tbilisi 
celebrating the end of the 2008 war, accompanied by singing, dancing and 
recitation of verses organized by the government. This did not allow the pop-
ulation to mourn the losses caused by the war in an authentic way, including 
the most often addressed loss in Georgia – the loss of its territorial integrity. 
In case of territorial integrity, there is an oscillation between triumphant and 
sentimental mourning. I.e. before the triumphant celebration of 2008, there 
was a campaign “Remember Abkhazia”10 which displayed posters with the 
phrase “Remember Abkhazia” in public spaces, which is another example of 
sentimental mourning. 
The latest traumatic incident concerning the previously mentioned 
“Prison Scandal”iv was also followed by pseudo-mourning. The way the stake-
holders deal with it prevents authentic mourning. Namely, ex-government 
officials (perceived “Aggressor”) did not acknowledge their responsibility for 
what has happened. At the same time, the legal responses initiated by the 
new government are not transparent. This combination resulted in the my-
thologization of the issue: nowadays the perception of what happened by the 
“Bystanders” differs: some of them believe that videos are fake while others 
believe that they are authentic. Due to this, “Bystanders” are not able to ac-
knowledge what has happened to the “Victims” (former prisoners). The for-
mer prisoners have attempted several times to assault the former government 
representatives whom they blame for the torture and the injustices, which 
they suffered. This is indicative of Revengeful (sadistic) mourning – implying 
embitterment, blaming, unwillingness to forgive, and therefore an inability to 
mourn and recover from what has happened. 
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Guilt, Shame, Rejection of the Past and the Non-acceptance of 
the Present: Mechanisms of Denial of Totalitarian Trauma 
To master totalitarian trauma, a society needs to work on dealing with 
the past. Due to the fact that society was (and still remains) divided onto 
“Victims”, “Aggressors” and “Bystanders”, a process of rethinking the past and 
reconciliation is needed to cure and heal.  Especially important is whether the 
perpetrator is willing to acknowledge his guilt to the victim, as well as by-
standers’ willingness to acknowledge to the victims that events, which caused 
their trauma, really happened (Garland& Hopper, 1980). At the same time, 
uncovering and assessing the negative practices that happen during totalitar-
ian regimes (reports to the secret police, treachery, slander and other brutal 
activities) trigger a huge resistance for a number of reasons. First of all, it has 
legal implications, as it might cause a sanctioned persecution of the perpetra-
tors. Not surprisingly, during the Georgian civil war, the KGB archive locat-
ed in the underground section of the Georgian parliament building was fully 
burned, in spite of the fact that according to professionals, the location and 
the safety mechanisms of the archive should have assured its safety in case 
of fire. Another barrier preventing a reconsideration of the past is what Vol-
kan would call “software factors”(Volkan, 2004) due to their purely psycho-
logical nature: these are the feelings of guilt and shame associated with what 
happened, among all the key subjects of the totalitarian situation: aggressors, 
victims and bystanders. Shame is a strong predictor for the development of 
the problematic post-traumatic conditions both at individual and collective 
levels (Herman, 1992). This, in turn, further hinders the capacity to mourn 
and deal with the past.  
Totalitarian trauma and its impact is overlooked and denied in Geor-
gia: the issue has never achieved a serious scale of public attention, and does 
not attract enough attention from academicians11 and civil society, except for 
the small community of social and political scientists and civil activists who 
speak about the need for “De-Stalinisation.” Discussion remains limited to 
a very narrow circle of those interested in the issue12. Denial reveals itself in 
the professional community of psychologists as well, where the issue is com-
pletely ignored. In spite of a developed tradition of psychological research, 
until now not a single psychological study in the country has been dedicated 
to the impact of totalitarian trauma, while it is well known from the profes-
sional literature, that: 
“(in) societies that are treated inhumanely due to political systems, such 
as . . . totalitarian regimes in former communist countries... even when politi-
cal and legal systems change and traumatizing elements within the society 
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are removed, individual and societal responses to the previously existing and 
devastating political system do not disappear overnight. Depending on the 
severity of the traumatizing events and how long they lasted, the influence of 
the shared trauma on the victimized group and their descendants may con-
tinue for decades”(Vamik D. Volkan, 2002, p.83).
Totalitarian trauma remains outside the attention of Georgian politi-
cians as well: since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Georgian inde-
pendence, no consistent efforts have been undertaken to build institution-
al mechanisms to deal with the past in the country. Along with the other 
causes, there were certain “software” factors preventing it, which I will try to 
uncover below. 
Immediately after becoming independent, under the rule of President 
Gamsakhurdia, the country suffered two interethnic-political conflicts and a 
civil war, accompanied by multiple (economic, political, social) crises, which 
did not leave time for rethinking the past, since it put the population into a 
survival mode. The ethnic conflicts were also facilitated by totalitarian trau-
ma, but that is not the topic of this article. The National Liberation Move-
ment, which led the struggle for independence, was focused on liberation 
from Russia. Thus, the totalitarian dimension of the past was pushed away. It 
required self-reflection, lustration, application of restorative justice and rec-
onciliation within the society rather than the externalization of the locus of 
control whereby the responsibility for ones own condition is shifted onto ex-
ternal forces only. 
Edouard Shevardnadze, who replaced President Gamaskurdia as a re-
sult of the civil war, served the Soviet regime himself, and thus the recon-
sideration of the Soviet past was suspended for the whole period of his rule. 
In 2003, before the Rose Revolution, one of the promises of the Na-
tional Movement party was the introduction of certain institutional mecha-
nisms for dealing with the past,13 but the discourse promoted after the move-
ment came to power was implying the construct “occupation-de-occupation” 
(again, putting whole of the responsibility for ones own troubles on external 
forces) and fully ignoring totalitarianism. Though Saakashvili’s government, 
in their revolutionary attempts to modernise the country, achieved a number 
of constructive changes, not much was achieved in the indicators for the un-
regressed large group. These indicators as described by Volkan and Stern are: 
freedom of speech, just and functioning civil institutions, a fair legal system, 
human rights based closed institutions such asmental health hospitals.  And I 
would add: prisons and children’s institutions, as well as an emphasis on gen-
der equality and children’s rights. On the one hand, this could be explained 
by the internalized totalitarian object within the ruling party, leading to the 
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division of the citizens into “Bad” and “Good” categories; another “software” 
cause could be the preoccupation of the government with the re-birth and 
death fantasy described by Carl Gustav Jung in 1939, manifesting itself via ac-
tions rejecting everything which was “before them” (people, institutions, ap-
proaches, even older people, etc.) as well as the assumption that the history 
of the Georgian state starts from their rule. Rejection of the past resulted in 
an inability to rethink it. 
The totalitarian period does not attract attention of the Georgian 
Dream party and their supporters either. After taking power at the end of 
2012, the focus of their attention narrowed to the injustices, which took place 
during the previous government’s rule. Any attempt to focus public attention 
on the justice issues related to Stalinism or the totalitarian period is met with 
emotional resistance and the stereotypical objection “Let us rather focus on 
the last nine years”. The typical rationale articulated by the Georgian Dream 
supporters sounds like the following: 
“You are speaking about things which happened 70-80 years ago, which 
we have not experienced personally and therefore are not interested in them, 
while there is more “alive”, newer violence committed by the ex-government, 
experienced by us, and of a scale with Stalin’s repressions!”( Javakhishvili, 
2013). 
There is no acknowledgement of the links between the “new violence” 
and totalitarian past. A dual position towards the rethinking of the past is 
maintained by another powerful stakeholder in the country: the Orthodox 
Church. On the one hand, in the epistles of the Patriarch of Georgia “com-
munists” are mentioned often as aggressors and damage-bringers to Georgia 
(Epistles, 2014). To a certain extent this might reflect the trauma, which the 
ecclesiastical community developed in response to the Soviet repressions of 
the clergymen. On the other hand, the Patriarch is complimentary to Staliniii. 
Since regaining independence, the Patriarch has become the most popular fa-
ther figure in Georgia. The sociological surveys reflect his stable approval rat-
ing which is often higher than 90% (NDI, 2014). Stemming from the norms 
of the Georgian Orthodox Church – full obedience of the believers to their 
“spiritual fathers”, forbidding the application of critical thinking both to the 
instructions received from them as well as to the religious dogma, and in-
strumentalization of fear (of God’s punishment) to achieve obedience – it is 
possible to suppose that the Georgian Orthodox Church and its leader filled 
a gap which appeared after the country became independent and became 
an internalized (“good”) totalitarian object for the Georgian population as a 
large group. It is symbolic that upon advocating an increasing birth rate, the 
Patriarch literally became a Godfather to more and more Georgians14.
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Flashbacks of the Totalitarian Trauma: Basic 
Assumptions in contemporary Georgia
Unprocessed traumatic experience leads groups to a shared feeling of 
helplessness, fears of annihilation and loss of identity. When a group fails to 
apply constructive coping strategies to deal with these feelings, it regresses 
(to the earlier stages of development) and is unable to maintain effective con-
tact with reality. This last Volkan defines as Narcisstic regress of a large group, 
Bion – as Psychotic state of a group, implying three basic assumptions, which 
kaleidoscopically alternate each other in the course of group’s psychodynam-
ics. These are: basic assumptions of a. Dependency, b. Fight& Flight (F&F) 
and c. Pairing.
If a group’s mentality is based on a Dependency assumption, group mem-
bers try to deal with their own helplessness via idealization of a leader, per-
ceiving him as omnipotent; at the same time they envy him/her; expectations 
towards the leader are so high and assumption of own responsibility is so di-
minished that usually leaders fail to satisfy expectations. The group interprets 
this as unwillingness to help; in response, the unconscious envy turns into 
anger/rage and they try to replace the leader with a new one, with whom the 
Dependency-cycle tends to repeat. Basic assumption of Fight & Flight re-
veals itself via splitting of the group: it could be a transitional stage, when a 
group becomes divided into supporters of an old and a new leader, and some 
group members fight with each other, while others are leaving the scene. The 
third basic assumption – Pairing – tries to deal with the anxiety and fear of 
identity loss via pairing and propagation projects, encouraging flirting and 
sexual relationships while at the same time requesting sacrifice of one’s own 
interests for the group’s interests. 
In addition to three basic assumptions described by Bion, Earl Hop-
per introduced a fourth basic assumption – Incohesion – with two possible 
modes: Aggregation and Massification (Hopper, 2003). According to Hop-
per, a large group experiencing the fear of annihilation could employ two 
polar defence strategies: either Fusion with the object or Fission (internal 
fragmentation). Fusion results in Massification, Fission results in Aggrega-
tion. Massification turns a large group into a homogenous conglomerate of 
individuals united around pseudo-solidarity, where individual autonomy no 
longer exists and is not tolerated, and instead anonymity and minimal role 
differentiation occurs; total uniformity of beliefs, values and norms are pre-
sumed and any deviation is considered as dangerous for the group’s identi-
ty and therefore not tolerated; here, following Volkan, it could be said that 
“minor differences become major issues”(Vamik D. Volkan, 2009). Within a 
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massified group, affects are contagious, and enchantment, magical thinking 
and pseudo-morality exhibited. As for Aggregation, it turns the group into a 
conglomerate of individuals with excessive role differentiation, polarization, 
cross pressures between the polarized fragments and corresponding conflicts, 
encapsulated sub-groups and contra-groups, with an absence of solidarity due 
to the absence of norms or ignorance of norms (Hopper, 2003).
In spite of the fact that Bion elaborated his theory based on research 
focused on small groups, and Earl Hopper was studying processes within 
groups uniting up to 150 individuals, all the basic assumptions described 
above are clearly observable in the contemporary socio-political life of Geor-
gia. This is in line with Volkan’s statement about finding basic assumptions 
of “Parasitic Dependency” described by Bion and Hopper’s in cohesiveness 
at the level of large groups (uniting hundreds, thousands and millions of in-
dividuals) which he studied (Vamik D. Volkan, 2009). According to Volkan, 
this could be explained by the regression of the large group to the earlier stag-
es of development, which makes psychodynamics of the large groups similar 
to what happens in the psychodynamics of small groups or even individual 
intra-psychic realm.
Basic Assumption of Dependency in Georgia reveals itself permanently 
via placing a bet by the general population on a certain leader and linking 
all hopes for the future to him. At a certain point, disenchantment with the 
leader occurs and the Dependency set-up turns into Fight and Flight (F & F). 
For example, President Gamsakhurdia, a former Soviet dissident and one of 
the national liberation movement leaders, was elected with 82% of the votes 
in 1991. Within one year, frustration of the basic human needs (Neef, 2011)
within the population triggered rapidly increasing dissatisfaction with the 
government and its leader. This turned into F & F between his supporters 
and supporters of the opposition (behind whom the next leader, Shevardnan-
dze, stood). F & F developed into the civil war, president Gamsakhurdia, to-
gether with his supporters had to leave the country; Shevardnadze took the 
reigns of power. The fight between Shevardnadze/his supporters and Gam-
sakhurdia/his supporters continued until the end of 1993, when Gamsakhur-
dia was found shot into head in one of the villages in Western Georgia where 
he was widely supported by the population. At some point in 1993, She-
vardnadze used Russian military troops (up to 2000 soldiers) to fight Gam-
sakhurdia’s supporters, which illustrates that geo-political factors influenced 
the described events, although, in parallel with the external and internal po-
litical factors, psychodynamics significantly contributed to the development 
of the described scenario. 
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Upon the return of the former Soviet leader, Shevardnadze, to the 
Georgian political stage in 1992, assumption of dependency was encour-
aged/legitimized by Patriarch of Georgia. He requested that several thou-
sand people gather for a meeting with Shevardnadze, fall on their knees and 
“convince” him to take power. 75% of the vote received by Shevardnadze in 
1995, was indicative of F & F assumption, which prepared context for his 
return to power.
Disenchantment with Shevardnadze culminated with the Rose Revo-
lution,15 which brought to the power president Saakashvili – young ex-mem-
ber of Shevardnadze’s team, ex-minister of Justice, surrounded by a young 
team of his own and supported by the West. At the beginning, Saakashvili 
received more than 96% of the votes, and became another personification of 
the Georgian population’s hopes, revealing the entrenched basic assumption of 
Dependency. After 5 years, in 2008, he collected around 53% of votes due to a 
number of reasons (the lost war with Russia, restricted freedom of expression 
and other human rights violations). By the end of 2012, disenchanted with 
Saakashvili and his government, majority of the population (54.97%) elect-
ed the Georgian Dream Coalition, though National Movement (ex-govern-
ment’s) party still gained 40.34% of voices and became a parliament minority. 
The pre-election period was characterized by an acute Fight and Flight, where 
the Georgian Orthodox Church took the side of the new political coalition 
as, according to anecdotal evidence, many orthodox priests at the time were 
advising their congregations to vote for them. F & F did not stop after the 
change of the government, it continues through the last two years and pre-
vents co-habitation of the political sides. As for today, several key members 
of Saakashvili’s team are imprisoned and a criminal investigation is initiated 
against him personally, which has led to him fleeing the country.
Relationships between the leader of the Georgian Dream coalition –
Ivanishvili (the richest person in Georgia, who earned his capital in 90’s, in 
Russia, and since then has been implementing a lot of charity projects in 
Georgia) and his followers is based again on the basic assumption of dependen-
cy. From the very beginning, the electorate perceived the leader and founder 
of the coalition – as omnipotent. In spite of the multiple problems existing 
in the country, the most-publicized message related to him and his coalition 
coming to power in 2012 was “Now everything will be wonderful”. Expect-
ing a miracle is also typical to the society in a regressed state.
The presidential elections of 2013, is another illustration of the De-
pendency assumption: the presidential candidate Margvelashvili (a philoso-
pher, who used to work as a rector of a private university, and then – after 
the Georgian Dream won – as a Minister of Education) was elected at Ivan-
33
The Soviet Legacy in Contemporary Georgia: A Psycho traumatological Perspective 
ishvili’s urging (who became the Prime Minister). Ivanishvili introduced the 
candidate to the general public as his “good friend,” promised that “he would 
be a lovely president” and convinced the electorate to vote for him. As a result 
of a blind trust conditioned by the dependency assumption, Margvelashvili 
gained the majority of the votes in the second round of elections. 
The above mentioned kaleidoscopic alternation of the basic assump-
tions of Dependency and Fight & Flight takes place in the peculiar societal 
context created by the fourth basic assumption described by Hopper. Here, 
the two parallel realities could be distinguished in Georgia – religious reality 
led by the basic assumption of Massification, and socio-political reality led by 
the basic assumption of Aggregation.
Massification is clearly observed in the relationship between the Geor-
gian Orthodox Church and its congregation via existing Fundamentalism, 
intolerance towards everything which is different from Orthodox Christian 
ideology (as it is understood by the Church), and pseudo-morality which is 
revealed through double standards and magical thinking. The most recent 
example of such double standards and magical thinking is the case of the 
congregation mobilized around the remains of a monk, much respected by 
the believers, Father Gabriel.16 Father Gabriel’s case reveals a tendency of the 
Church to act as a gatekeeper and seek control of the socio-political life in 
the country by means of massification or by utilizing the massification of its 
congregation around religious issues.
Aggregation reveals itself on the current socio-political scene of Georgia 
via the polarization of the ex-government and current government support-
ers, politicians and the electorate belonging to these two camps, as well as via 
all the other stakeholders existing on the socio-political stage who do not be-
long to these two polarised camps but play roles in societal psychodynamics: 
ethnic, religious, sexual and other minorities, civil society, so called “Thieves 
in Law”, etc. Competing pressures between these segments of society, corre-
sponding conflicts and utilized double-standards represent aggregation. I.e. 
the fact that the ex-prime minister Ivanishvili formally left the political stage 
but informally goes on ruling reveals the absence of norms, which create con-
ditions for further confusion and hostilities within the society. The Georgian 
Orthodox Church is one of the players in the aggregated societal scene as 
well: the latest example is the hearing of the Antidiscrimination Law by the 
Parliament of Georgia, where Church representatives were trying to prevent 
the adoption of the law. After failing to convince the Parliament, they tried 
to use the potential of the massificated congregation and to mobilise people 
via collecting signatures against the adopted legislation in the streets.
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In line with the basic assumption of Dependancy, participation in 
Fight  & Flight, catalization of massification and taking part in aggrega-
tion, the Georgian Orthodox Church actualizes basic assumptions of Pairing 
in tandem with different stakeholders within the country; i.e. the so-called 
“National Demographic Foundation” was initiated, taking further the pair-
ing/propagation assumption introduced by the Patriarch and uniting three 
stakeholders: representatives of the Parliament of Georgia, businessmen, and 
the Patriarch of Georgia. Besides baptizing practices a clear illustration of 
the Paring assumption is the coming together of the Georgian Orthodox 
Church/patriarchy and the descendants of the Georgian royal family. Several 
years ago, the Patriarch facilitated the marriage of the representatives of the 
royal families in order to give birth to a legal heir of the Georgian monarchy. 
For this reason, a representative of the Bagrationi royal family, which immi-
grated from Georgia due to the Russian occupation in the beginning of the 
20th century, returned to Georgia and married a daughter of the Bagration-
Gruzinski royal family line which remained in Georgia during the Soviet pe-
riod. After a baby boy was born, the pair divorced, the patriarch baptised the 
baby and announced him as the legal heir of the monarchy, even though no 
Georgian kingdom has existed for centuries in the country; in addition – the 
two families are in the middle of F & F, due to which the legitimacy of the 
heir is not yet acknowledged.
Conclusions
Totalitarian trauma in Georgia is present both at an individual and so-
cietal levels and reveals itself as the internalized totalitarian object. Unlike at 
the individual level, where the trauma is acknowledged, totalitarian trauma 
is denied at the societal level, which leads to the resistance in dealing with 
the past.
Internalized totalitarian object reveals itself on a societal level via to-
talitarian object-relationships, with the political and religious leaders. This 
creates regressive basic assumptions-based psychodynamics within Georgian 
society as a large group.
Totalitarian trauma reveals itself in the contemporary life of the Geor-
gian Society via four problematic basic assumptions: Dependency, Fight and 
Flight, Pairing, and Incohesiveness (Aggregation & Massification). All of 
these four basic assumptions are interchangeable, and keep Georgian society 
in a closed circle of traumatic identity, implying Victim-Aggressor-Bystander 
modus of interaction and preventing effective contact with reality.
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The Georgian Orthodox Church plays a significant role in the realiza-
tion of all the basic assumptions: it catalyzes the realization of the Depen-
dency, takes sides in the F & F responses, works to realize the basic assump-
tion of Paring, facilitates massification and at the same time, tries to play a 
role in the aggregation via attempts to influence politics and different policies.
Unprocessed totalitarian trauma made the country’s population vulner-
able to new traumas, which took place after becoming independent (traumas 
related to the ethnic-political conflicts, civil war, 2008 war with Russia, the 
prison scandal). This vulnerability increases the risk of having these traumas 
be utilized for political manipulations, which, in turn, hinders the develop-
ment of the country.
Notes:
1. The Stalin’s statue in the city centre of Gori (his hometown) was erected 
during his lifetime, in 1953, and removed on November 25, 2010, during 
the night to avoid public protest from his supporters in his hometown.
2. For the first time the sculpture was reinstalled in the village Zemo Al-
vani of Akhmeta region on December 21, 2012. In one week’s time the 
monument was painted pink by unknown persons.  In January 2013, Sta-
lin’s bust was re-erected in the village Akuri in the Telavi region. About 
three weeks later, people removed the bust from the pedestal and painted 
it pink. In Telavi, Stalin’s sculpture was erected on 1st of September. The 
same night, unknown people painted the sculpture red. 
3.  In July of 2013, Georgian Patriarch Ilia II went with an official visit to 
Moscow where he met the Russian Patriarch Kirill, as well as the Rus-
sian president Vladimir Putin and was complimentary of Stalin in his 
conversation with the Russian leader and confirmed his perception of 
Stalin as a great leader (and a believer at the end of his life) in his inter-
views with the Georgian media widely broadcasted in the country.
4. In the pre-election period of 2012, political opposition facilitated a pub-
lic broadcast (via leading TV channels) of the videos showing torture 
that took place in the penitentiary system of Georgia. The reaction of the 
public was extremely emotional and played a critical role in the ousting 
of the National Movement Government.  
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5. Following Volkan, under large group, I mean groups of tens, hundreds, 
millions of individuals who share religious, and/or ethnic, and/or nation-
al and/or ideological identity; due to the group’s size, most of the indi-
viduals will never meet with each other in their lifetime, but share certain 
identity linking them. “Under large group processes is meant not homo-
geneousness of the certain group but observable societal trends revealing 
themselves in societal life.” In: Volkan, Vamik, D. and Folwer, Christo-
pher, F.: Large Group Narcissism and Political Leaders. Psychiatric An-
nals, 39/4, April 2009.
6. Those who were witnessing repressions and keeping silent, did not 
protest/intervene.
7. The given sub-chapter reflects some findings of the research studying in-
tergenerational transmission of the Stalinist totalitarian trauma among 
family members of the repressed ( Javakhishvili, 2011).
8.  According to Klein, division of the external world into “good” and “bad” 
objects is a stage in the development of a child (Paranoid position by 
Klein’s terms), and the normal course of development leads to the unifi-
cation of good and bad and the ability to perceive them as the two qual-
ities of one entity (Depressive position by Klein’s terms). Even when 
the developmental task of unification is achieved, in the particular cir-
cumstances (i.e. totalitarian environment which splits the external world 
into victims and aggressors) a person could regress to the earlier stage of 
development.
9. At different ages, a Soviet person was always a part of an ideological sys-
tem (the Lenin youth, the pioneers, etc.) which comprised a chain of the 
Soviet factory, meant for the production of the “homo Sovieticus.” 
10. Abkhazia, a region of Georgia, following the inter-ethnic-political con-
flict during the early 1990s is now separated from Georgia; more than 
250.000 internally displaced persons fled from the conflict to the rest of 
Georgia.
11. Except Ilia State University, which introduced a Soviet Studies masters 
program as well as a doctoral program and facilitates relevant research 
since 2010.  
12. Only a few civil society organizations are focused on it: Sovlab, non-gov-
ernmental organization founded as a project of the Heinrich Böll Foun-
dation, operating since 2009. Memorial, founded in 1992, and based on 
the model of the Russian NGO Memorial focusing on Soviet repres-
sions, which due to scarce finances does not have even an office at the 
moment.
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13. In the document “10 Steps to Freedom” composed by the civil society 
leaders together with the future government representatives, lustration 
was named as one of the 10 key steps of the intended reforms, but the 
promise was not accomplished.  The legislation concerning lustration was 
adopted by the parliament only in 2011, it was elaborated without con-
sultations with civil society and discussion within the general public, and 
was never realized. Also, the measures foreseen there were of a symbolic 
character (i.e. ban of Soviet symbols in public premises) with little real 
impact on addressing the Soviet past.
14. The patriarch of Georgia, in 2007, introduced an initiative to baptize ev-
ery third and following child of those families who are Orthodox and 
are wed according to the Orthodox tradition. For 2011, it was estimated 
by the Church that up to 7,000 children were baptized (according to the 
Church, “some possibly would not be born if not for this initiative), and 
Patriarch declared his will to continue the baptizing of every fourth and 
following child. After a child is baptized, the family is awarded the title 
of “Safeguard of the Patriarchy Throne” plus “Dedicated Son/Daughter 
of the Fatherland” (at: http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/53557-patriarqi-
axali-iniciativit-gamovida [Accessed 29 Oct. 2014]).
15. Rose Revolution – a peaceful revolution supported by the civil society of 
Georgia and the West, resulted in a change of government in 2003.
16. Father Gabriel is a very interesting figure whose life reflects peculiarities 
of the totalitarian past and post-totalitarian present of Georgia. He was 
born in a family with a communist father and a religious mother.  His 
father forbade his mother from exercising her faith, until he was killed 
by anti-communist rebels in 1931. Father Gabriel became a prist after 
returning home from military service, in the early 50’s. Though it was 
still in the Stalinist period (1951), upon arrival he built a little church 
in his yard. In a while, he became the first monk to be baptized in Sovi-
et Georgia (after the repressions of clergymen nobody dared to become 
a monk). During Khrushchev’s rule, he burned a big (12 square meter) 
poster of Lenin displayed on the building of Tbilisi Municipality for the 
1st of May demonstration, in 1965. He was immediately imprisoned and 
sentenced to death; later on he was diagnosed as mentally ill and was 
transferred from prison to the psychiatric hospital for “treatment” where 
he spent several years. After coming out of the hospital he started to live 
and serve in a monastery. He began healing people and gained an out-
standing popularity and respect among the population. At the same time, 
he distanced himself from the Church, due to his un-compromising and 
non-conformist nature, which did not appreciate the collaboration of the 
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Church with the Soviet regime. After the liberation of the country in the 
90’s he continued his life in monastery – helping people and shunning 
the power struggles and the luxurious life-styles, which became the norm 
within the Georgian Orthodox Church. His popularity was steadily in-
creasing among the Georgian population – especially due to his hones-
ty and dedication as well as his capacity for healing. He passed away in 
1995, was buried according to his will in the yard of his monastery and 
his grave became a holly place for many people. Mother Paraskeva was 
taking care of him during his life and after his death became a kind of 
a gatekeeper of his grave and some of his belongings, which were con-
sidered sacred. Father Gabriel’s popularity increased even more after his 
death. 
 In 2012, the Church canonized Father Gabriel as a saint, thus laying 
claim to the ownership of father Gabriel’s legacy. At the beginning of 
January 2014, mother Paraskeva stated that she had a vision according 
to which if a person would visit father Gabriel’s grave before Christmas 
(the 7th of January for the Georgian Orthodox), two of his/her wishes 
would be fulfilled. Tens of thousands of people started visiting the place 
of the monk’s burial, expecting a miracle. 
 Following this incident, the Church, in February, moved the remains of 
the monk from the grave located at the monastery’s cemetery, organized 
an official funeral, which lasted for several weeks and re-buried him in-
side the monastery. A large amount of people were trying to attend the 
ceremony of the removal of the remains as there was a widespread rumor 
that the father’s body was uncorrupted by decay. But the Church made 
an iron fence to restrict people’s access and at the same time distributed 
“VIP” passes to politicians and those whom it considered as “privileged” 
to attend the event. Shortly after mother Paraskeva was withdrawn from 
the Monastery where she lived. Thus, the Church became a literal gate-
keeper of Father Gabriel’s legacy.
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